construction. Hence it shifts from an empiricist explanation that relies on a truthful representation of the facts, to a hermeneutic understanding that relies on persuasive interpretation (Shapiro 2013, pp. 29-30; Bryman 2012, pp. 26-32) : rather than calculate 'how much', it asks 'what does soft power mean?', and 'does it mean something different in an authoritarian state?' Simply put, the essay argues that soft power works in a different way in China. While Nye sees soft power as a positive attractive force that is useful for a state's foreign policy, Chinese discussion of soft power is interesting because it does the opposite: soft power is negative rather than positive, and is employed as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign policy.
When thinking about China's curious approach to soft power, two when Ambassador Liu Xiaoming (2014) tried to build friendship with Britons by denouncing Japan as 'Voldemort' in both the print and the electronic media. Many thought that such name-calling was strange for a diplomat, and
were not impressed by China's literal demonizing of Japan (Hayashi, K 2014; McCurry 2014; 'Latest China-Japan Spat' 2014) . Yet Ambassador Liu's high profile criticism of Japan in the UK was seen as very successful in Beijing;
over the next month China's ambassadors in the United States, Australia and other countries engaged in similar public diplomacy activities in those countries' national media.
What are we to do with these two examples? Is one soft power While it is common now to dismiss Nye's notion of soft power as a 'fuzzy concept', this essay takes it seriously by showing how soft power is employed in different ways in different contexts, specifically here how it takes a curiously negative form in Chinese discussions of the PRC's relation to the world. This is increasingly important as China's soft power strategy goes global due to the PRC's growing wealth and confidence, in the context of economic and political crises in Europe and the US since 2008 (Callahan 2013) .
Power: Hard/soft, positive/negative, foreign/domestic
As mentioned above, Nye concentrates on the positive aspects of soft power as a foreign policy tool. He famously defines it as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments' (Nye 2004, p. x) .
The Chinese case, however, suggests that we need a more complex view of soft power dynamics. Rather than limit our inquiry to 'soft power' as a 'positive' tool for 'foreign policy', it is helpful to understand the contingent dynamics of hard/soft power, positive/negative strategies, and foreign/domestic politics. Nye himself is going in this direction with the new concept of 'smart power', a strategy that describes a successful 'combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction' (Nye 2011:xiii) . Here I will concentrate on the positive/negative and foreign/domestic relations that are less discussed in Nye's work. an entity that can be empirically measured, so much as a domestic process of social construction that defines the symbolic borders of self and Other, and thus of identity and security (see Connolly 1991, pp. 36-63; Walker 1993; Campbell 1998; Callahan 2010) . Yet alongside this positive view of a benevolent China that embraces the outside world, identity and security are linked in the negative process of drawing symbolic borders between self and Other. Rather than a set of stable 'essential values', civilization here is better understood as a contingent discourse that takes shape in relation to its opposite: barbarism. As political theorist Walter Benjamin (1968, p. 256-7) argues, 'There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.' In these contingent self/Other relations, whenever we declare something civilized, we are simultaneously declaring something else barbaric (Todorov 2010; Campbell 1998) . While Chinese texts often talk about 5000 years of civilization, it is necessary to recognize that in order to affirm 'civilization', they first need to create and then exclude 'barbarians'.
Certainly, the difference between civilization and barbarism seems obvious; but as historian Arthur Waldron (1990, p. 190) points out that answering the questions 'Who is China?' and 'Where is China?' has never been easy. Foreign policy elites in imperial China had their own identity dilemma, and thus constantly debated where to draw the border between inside and outside as they defined their 'civilization' with and against the 'barbarian'. Identity and security are linked here in a moral hierarchy to divide the Chinese self from the barbaric Other, with 'China being internal, large, and high and barbarians being external, small and low' (Yang 1968, p. 20) .
This is not just a debate about ancient history: the Civilization/barbarian distinction that informed Chinese domestic and foreign policy in imperial times is making a comeback today as a model for domestic politics and international affairs (see Ma Rong 2004; Leibold 2013; Tobin 2014) . Domestic politics thus is tied to foreign relations through this distinction: a positive, civilized inside takes shape only when it is distinguished from a negative barbaric outside.
China's current identity/security dynamic operates in much the same way through 'negative soft power': the Chinese self is defined as 'civilized' through the deliberate creation and then exclusion of Others as 'barbarians'. This process polices what counts as 'Chinese' in a way that simultaneously creates imagined Others: 'America', 'Japan', and 'the West'. This is similar to the process whereby the Russia seeks to generate soft power through the promotion of anti-American conspiracy theories on the RT television network: the goal is less to promote Russia values, and more to 'spoil the image of the United States' (Yablokov 2015, p. 12 (Yablokov 2015, p. 2), China's negative soft power strategy is employed primarily as a tactic for the domestic problem of building regime legitimacy (see Edney 2012 Edney , 2015 . Domestic/foreign policy thus is closely linked to civilization/barbarism and positive/negative expressions of power. In other words, to understand the positive soft power of China's dreams, you need to understand the negative soft power of its nightmares.
Soft Power and the China Dream
The Wang's article thus exemplifies the two main arguments of this essay: 1) rather than extolling China's attractive strengths, soft power is often expressed in a negative way that equates 'the foreign' with 'mistakes' that are either stupid misunderstandings or evil conspiracies, both of which are accused of undermining China's rightful rise; 2) this discussion is largely taking place in domestic space through Chinese-language materials involved in the 'identity dilemma' about who China should be-and who it should not be.
Rather than being attractive and embracing difference, the China dream is part of a broad practice whereby identity is constituted by excluding difference. It is seen as a tool in a global soft power battle that will produce clear winners and losers in a life-or-death zero-sum struggle. As one of the first theorists of the China dream, Colonel Liu Mingfu (2010, p. 9), explained, 'If China in the twenty-first century cannot become world number one, cannot become the top power, then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside.'
Conclusion
This essay has argued that we need to have a more complex view of soft power. First it questioned the dominant view that soft power is an entity, a variable, which can be empirically measured. It argued that soft power is best understood as a social construction that can tell us about identity and security dynamics, in particular the contingent relations of hard/soft power, positive/negative strategies, and foreign/domestic politics.
While mainstream soft power theory looks to idealized notions of the self (e.g. 'national image') that are exported to benefit foreign relations, the essay used Chinese texts to develop the idea of 'negative soft power', where identity is constructed by excluding difference in an identity/security dynamic that primarily works in domestic space. Chinese civilization characteristically is seen as a major source of the PRC's soft power; the essay argued that civilization is not an 'entity' but generally takes shape against the negative power evokes a form of nationalism that is employed to safeguard the CCP's regime legitimacy (see Edney 2015) . China Dream discourse thus combines the insights of Edney's and Yablokov's (2015) articles: soft power is generated through the negative dynamic of conspiracy theories in the service of building national 'cohesion' in domestic space. While the PRC is strong in economic and military terms, its regime security as 'fragile superpower' is more tenuous (Shirk 2008) . Hence soft power in China takes on more negative forms that are directed at a domestic audience.
Yet according to Nye's version of soft power, foreign audiences are crucial; if soft power products are not attractive to them, then the soft power strategy is unsuccessful. Certainly, we could follow the current academic trend to celebrate how China has adopted and adapted the soft power concept to suit its needs. But if a goal is to turn enemies into friends, then it is not working very well. Here the PRC is a 'partial power' whose global influence is broad, but thin (Shambaugh 2013, p. 268 ).
This is a major problem for soft power in hard states. 
